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ABSTRACT
Traditional payment systems have standards designed to keep transaction data secure, but
blockchain systems are not in scope for such security standards. We compare the Payment
Application Data Security Standard’s (PA-DSS) applicability towards transaction-supported
blockchain platforms to test the standard’s applicability. By highlighting the differences in
implementation on traditional and decentralized transaction platforms, we critique and adapt the
standards to fit the decentralized model. In two case studies, we analyze the QTUM and Ethereum
blockchain platforms’ industry compliance, as their payment platforms support transactions
equivalent to that of applications governed by the PA-DSS. We determine QTUM’s and
Ethereum’s capabilities to properly ensure secure data handling with respect to current security
standards. After adapting the PA-DSS and analyzing the QTEIM and Ethereum platforms, we
revise the new set of standards to create a set ofbest-practices for ensuring data security on both
traditional and blockchain payment systems. We report the security gaps identified on each
platform based on the final revision of the standards, presenting a conclusive perspective that
neither platform is suitable for business adoption based on the PA-DSS standard’s results. Finally,
we discuss open research issues.
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ABSTRACT
Traditional payment systems have standards designed to keep trans¬
action data secure, but blockchain systems are not in scope for such
security standards. We compare the Payment Application Data
Security Standard’s (PA-DSS) applicability towards transaction-
supported blockchain platforms to test the standard’s applicability.
By highlighting the differences in implementation on traditional
and decentralized transaction platforms, we critique and adapt the
standards to fit the decentralized model. In two case studies, we
analyze the QTUM and Ethereum blockchain platforms’ industry
compliance, as their payment platforms support transactions equiv¬
alent to that of applications governed by the PA-DSS. We determine
QTUM’s and Ethereum’s capabilities to properly ensure secure data
handling with respect to current security standards. After adapting
the PA-DSS and analyzing the QTUM and Ethereum platforms, we
revise the new set of standards to create a set of best-practices for
ensuring data security on both traditional and blockchain payment
systems. We report the security gaps identified on each platform
based on the final revision of the standards, presenting a conclusive
perspective that neither platform is suitable for business adoption
based on the PA-DSS standard’s results. Finally, we discuss open
research issues.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1.1 Motivation
Legal liability in the digital age is increasingly dynamic, both in
theory and practice. Contracts have transformed as industries grow
more adjusted to technology. Paper and pen have morphed to lines
of code, and with it, the legal contracts have been challenged in
implementation. The definition of a contract remains the same: an
agreement between two parties outlined by the terms and condi¬
tions, wherein value is exchanged [24]. The conditions set by this
definition allow both parties to protect their interests through a
document that binds them to a set of rules. As the world transitions
to a more digitalized era, smart contracts have been introduced as a
replacement for the arduous, tedious legal agreements of the past.
Smart contracts were first devised by Nick Szabo, who docu¬
mented the idea of a contract automation in 1997 [19]. To present
his idea, Szabo provided an example between a human and a vend¬
ing machine: The vending machine, depending on the human’s
input (in coins) would allow or disallow candy to be dispensed from
the machine. At the base-level, this is precisely what a smart con¬
tract does: assure an exchange of data with anybody who satisfies
the constraints set forth by the contract. His rationale envisioned
the smart contracts’ adoption across the industry, spanning over
multitudes of applications. His focus, however, revolved around
the profitability and feasibility to implement this technology on
a large scale, as any smart contract that is created, in his vision,
should have safeguards whose robustness depends on the process
performed.
According to Szabo [19], the security concerns for each smart
contract should exist within the bounds of the business transaction.
Essentially, as in any security system, the controls in place should
not outstrip nor fall short of the functionality of the process. For
example, the vending machine that Szabo describes also features
security controls, such as a lock to open the machine. These mech¬
anisms should not inhibit profitability. In 2002, Szabo developed a
second work [20] that elaborates on his previous ideas on smart con¬
tract development. This second paper defines a set of guidelines to
follow when designing smart contracts, such as monitoring code de¬
velopment to prevent exploitation (e.g. contract breaching), which
may be done if a smart contract is not configured or programmed
properly. Overall, this second work serves as a reference to create
contracts, especially in the scope of auditing. Some of these compo¬
nents, which if not implemented properly may result in security
gaps, can be seen in current smart contract implementations.
Current smart contracts are built on blockchain technology. Thus,
to understand the functionality and security concerns of smart con¬
tracts, it is necessary to understand the focal points of blockchain
security. Moreover, all instances of cryptocurrency, beginning with
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Satoshi Nakamoto and bitcoin, are built on blockchain technol¬
ogy [18]. Blockchain provides a decentralization of information
on a given network. Typical networks, which can be identified
as centralized to contrast with blockchain, often have one central
point where all the information is stored. The decentralized design
of blockchain serves both as a failsafe and a protection against
data alteration as the information is distributed and spread over
multiple hosts (called nodes). Consequently, there is a copy of all
data on each device that cannot be altered. Additionally, account
management on blockchain platforms are often rooted in privacy
measures to ensure anonymity on this decentralized network. From
the perspective of cybersecurity, the challenge in smart contracts
lies within the authentication, communication, and execution of
the technology. The difference in implementation between central¬
ized and decentralized networks results in a difference in security
approach. Decentralized platforms may necessitate additional mea¬
sures in place to verify a legally binding agreement, ensure privacy
on a distributed network, and conduct a secure transaction ofgoods.
Smart contracts, along with blockchain as a whole, have grown
in interest over the past years. Many companies have begun work
on fitting the technology into their business model. The scope
of smart contracts’ potential impact on global solutions is wide.
From business optimization to disaster recovery, smart contracts
offer alternative methods to common business issues. However,
with adoption in the industry, especially within the realms of the
Payment Card Industry (PCI), healthcare, and other industries who
handle private user data, user privacy protection is mandatory. As
such, smart contract platforms that wish to be adapted to enterprise
environments must comply or exceed certain security standards,
often modeled after industry best practices. Whatever standard an
organization chooses to use matters in the case of smart contracts,
as often times the immutability of blocks on a blockchain result in
tedious efforts to prevent disastrous vulnerabilities. That is, a smart
contract with a security flaw must be disabled and replaced, which
is a much taller task than rolling out a patch for centralized systems.
As the roles of smart contracts and blockchain platforms grow as
payment systems, so too does the necessity for proper auditing
and compliance to ensure proper data protection. The purpose of
this paper is to provide a method by which to measure the security
of a smart contract’s platform. This is done by categorizing the
controls and mechanisms that the platform enforces for security
and analyzing them to determine their compliance. To achieve this
categorization and compliance analysis, an application security
framework, paired with a risk assessment framework, will be used
to evaluate the platform. Many organizations utilize the same types
of frameworks to audit their security program for strengths and
weaknesses; therefore, it is the baseline tool for this research.
This research adapts the Payment Application Data Security Stan¬
dard (PA-DSS) to meet the needs of blockchain payment systems.
As blockchain and smart contract platforms grow in popularity, the
necessity for security standards on these platforms increases. Once
the standards are reworked, we analyze two smart contract plat¬
forms as case studies: QTUM (pronounced quantum) and Ethereum.
QTUM is a smart contract system that functions across multiple
devices. Claiming functionality on mobile, QTUM seeks to bridge
the gap between blockchain systems and the business world. As it
stands, there is a disconnect between the two for multiple reasons,
namely the spatial complexity required for blockchains on a given
host computer. QTUM offers solutions for the adoption of smart
contract systems into enterprise environments, and this project
seeks to outline the implemented security controls. Ethereum is
a popular smart contract supporting blockchain with a large user
base. Its structured smart contract language makes it ideal for busi¬
ness adoption. Both platforms have strengths that make them more
adaptable to business functions than other platforms. We analyze
both to test the revised PA-DSS standards.
1.2 Purpose of this Research
The QTUM (pronounced quantum) platform is the smart contract
system that functions across multiple devices. Claiming functional¬
ity on mobile, QTUM seeks to bridge the gap between blockchain
systems and the business world. As it stands, there is a disconnect
between the two for multiple reasons, namely the spatial complex¬
ity required for blockchains on a given host computer. QTUM offers
solutions for the adoption of smart contract systems into enterprise
environments, and this project seeks to outline the implemented
security controls. As a result, we will analyze the QTUM platform to
determine if it is compliant with the standards set in the application
security framework. We also analyze the Ethereum platform, a pop¬
ular smart contract supporting blockchain with a large user base.
Its structured smart contract language makes it ideal for business
adoption. This paper is structured as follows:
• Section 1: Introduction and Motivation
• Section 2: Background Information
• Section 3: Related Work
• Section 4: Methodology
• Section 5: Results
• Section 6: Conclusion and Future Work
This research will be a traditional thesis, and the structure fol¬
lows the standard Association for Computing Machinery format.
Many venues are applicable for this work, especially those relating
to either security or blockchain. The International Workshop on
Emerging Trends in Software Engineering for blockchain hosted its
first event in 2017, setting a precedent for blockchain in formalized
research. This workshop is also a part of the larger International
Conference on Software Engineering, a highly prestigious con¬
ference led by the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).
Additionally, there are multiple venues for security research, includ¬
ing Conference for Information Systems Security Education (CISSE)
and ACM Southeast. The conference(s) this work is submitted to
will depend highly on the emerging results, which will be more
concrete as the project advances (Computer Science conferences
acceptance and awards are highly results-based, as in many other
discipline).
2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section of the work discusses the preliminary technical in¬
formation necessary to understand the analysis done later in the
research. Smart contract anatomy, including qualities such as trans¬
action models and consensus algorithms, requires a discussion of
blockchain technology as a whole. This sections briefly outlines
the different characteristics a platform may contain, which sets the
foundation for critiquing the security mechanisms present on a
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given system. This section is intended for a reader to familiarize
himself or herself with the technology as it relates to the work
documented in this paper.
Blockchain technology has the potential to solve major security
principles by its inherent design. For example, data integrity, the
confidence a party has in ensuring the information transmitted or
accessed has not been altered, is partially solved by blockchain.
Because the data is distributed over all nodes on the network, it
is only possible to change the stored data if it is changed on all
nodes; this is infeasible with current computational capabilities.
Data availability is also evident, for all information is stored directly
on a node’s machine. This results in a scenario where a node has
direct access to the blockchain and its data.
When discussing security controls in any capacity, it is essential
to first form a foundation around what makes applications, systems,
or data secure. The major tenets of security are confidentiality,
integrity, and availability; some other tenets include authentication
and nonrepudiation. There are many other concepts to consider in
security, but the ones mentioned above are the ones necessary to
understand the security mechanisms of smart contract platforms.
Confidentiality concerns keeping information private from unau¬
thorized eyes. Common controls to ensure confidentiality include
encryption, hash functions, and encoding. These are standard and
required in many payment systems today. Integrity keeps infor¬
mation from altered by unauthorized users. Availability ensures
that the data is available when needed by authorized parties. Au¬
thentication is a method of confirming the identity of a user or
system; this ensures that only authorized users can read or alter
data. Nonrepudiation is a concept that maintains that a user cannot
deny an action that he or she performed.
2.1 Smart Contract Anatomy
Smart contracts operate on blockchain technology, which acts as
a distributed ledger for all present information. Blockchain, in
essence, is a decentralized platform on which transactions are exe¬
cuted, recorded, and maintained. To explain, the blockchain itself
is not stored on a central location; rather, it is stored on every par¬
ticipating node (computer) in a given network. This quality is what
differentiates blockchain from other centralized platforms. There is
no single point of failure, nor is there any single target for attack.
The blockchain is immutable, and it provides a platform on which
permanent items can be stored. One such item is a smart contract.
If blockchain is the platform on which transactions are executed,
recorded, and maintained, then smart contracts can be described
as the mechanisms by which these transactions are automated.
Figure 1 depicts two individuals agreeing on a smart contract. In
the figure, the contract is stored on the blockchain, ensuring its
immutability an authenticity for both parties regardless of party
trust. However, within smart contracts, there are multiple avenues
for implementation, each offering varying levels of privacy and
security.
2.2 Transaction Models on Blockchain
Above all, smart contracts offer automated transactions with re¬
duced overhead when compared to traditional contracts. These
& $
*>»«>»
Figure 1: Anatomy of a smart contract [6]
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Figure 2: UTXO transaction example [1]
transactions can be carried out in two methods: unspent transac¬
tion output or account-based. Both models have seen widespread
use in different blockchain technologies, and both have benefits
and disadvantages regarding decentralization and privacy.
The Unspent Transaction Output model (hereafter referred to
as UTXO) was developed by Satoshi Nakamoto, first seen in the
publication for Bitcoin [18]. in 2008. In this work, Satoshi covered a
range of topics for implementing blockchain technology, including
the UTXO model, proof of work (covered in a later section), and
cryptocurrency mining. UTXO works by assigning a unique iden¬
tifier for each transaction. It should also be noted that this is true
for the initial mining of the bitcoin, which returns a determined
value. These unique identifiers are the backbone of UTXO, as they
are used as inputs and outputs for each transaction that occurs on
the blockchain. Figure 2 details UTXO. The users in the transaction
are somewhat anonymized, for the accounts used in transactions
are not directly linked to personal information. Therefore, UTXO
is, by default, primitively private for users on the blockchain. The
steps for UTXO are listed below:
• User 1 sends currency. This step is depicted as one arrow
and may be interpreted as a single currency or coin sent, but
the reality may be multiple transactions of smaller amounts
that comprise the required transaction amount (e.g.. User
1 may need to send 20 coins for the transaction. He or she
may send coins of values 5, 5, and 10 to sum 20. These can
be sent, or a single transaction of value 20 can be sent).
• The required transaction amount is sent to User 2 and a
unique output value that is different from the input value
sent in step 1. This is a critical step in the UTXO model.
• If applicable, User 1 is sent change from his or her inputted
values. This only applies if User 1 sent more currency than
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Previous Sttte Next State
Figure 3: Acount-based model transaction example [1]
required by the transaction. This output is different from
the input value(s) (e.g., if User 1 sends 25 currency on a 20-
currency transaction, he or she will be refunded 5 currency
during this step).
The account-based model resembles what one might see in a
traditional banking system. Two users are given accounts, and they
are able to conduct transactions, given there is enough money to
be sent. This model differs greatly from UTXO, as it seemingly
eliminates a portion of the decentralization by forcing a trusted
party to maintain accounts on the blockchain. Essentially, there is
an established account system that mirrors a digital bank, which
limits the privacy of this transaction model. Figure 3 depicts the
transaction. The steps can be seen below:
• Account 1 sends currency
• Account 2 receives currency
Each transaction model has benefits and detriments to its design,
but each is popular within its own niche. UTXO was the first transac¬
tion model, introduced when blockchain was initially proposed [4],
and the goal lies in anonymity. UTXO surpasses the account-based
model in this sense, for UTXO offers a transaction without basis in
accounts. It simply takes the currency much like a vending machine,
computing the return value and forwarding the transaction to its
intended destination. The downfall here is complexity. With UTXO,
transactions rely on more computations to sum the inputs and re¬
turn change if applicable. As a result, there are multiple steps to the
transaction that do not exist when using a simpler design. This is
where the account-based model succeeds. Account-based systems,
which can be seen in many popular blockchains such as Ethereum,
utilize a much more standardized method to execute transactions.
Not unlike a bank, there exist two parties looking to conduct a
transaction. These two parties, much like in modern banking, have
accounts wherein their balance is stored. The account-based model
utilizes these accounts to verify that there is enough aAlJmoneyaAI
to be sent for the transaction. The benefit here is the simplicity of
the model; streamlined by accounts, the transactions rely only on
verification of valid funds to execute. However, the anonymity is
called into question when accounts can be linked to one another
through transactions. Both UTXO and account-based models have
found homes in various blockchain technologies, often dependent
on the goal of the blockchain.
2.3 Purpose of PA-DSS Standards
The Payment Application Data Security Standard, more commonly
referred to as the (PA-DSS), was first published in 2008 as the Pay¬
ment Application Best Practices (PABS) [23]. It is currently gov¬
erned by five major global payment brands: American Express,
Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard World¬
wide, and Visa Inc. These organizations collaborate to determine
the security requirements for third-party payment applications. It
should be noted that this standard specifically targets third-party
payment applications, for their systems are likely to be distributed
to multiple vendors. As such, their system will not be tailored for
a single organization; tailored solutions or applications built for a
single company are not mandated by this standard. The PA-DSS
standards have existed from 2008, but they have been through sev¬
eral iterations since then [23]. Version 1 was published when the
PABS was formed. Two years later, version 2.0 was released, and in
2013, version 3.0 was published. The current version, v3.2, holds
minor changes outside the actual standards list. For this reason, we
choose to use version 3.0 for this study. Because of the scope of
this research, it is clear that payment applications are within scope
of this standard, regardless of specified technology. Blockchain
platforms, in most use cases, can be considered payment systems.
Because they are also not typically developed by organizations that
may use them, they can also be assumed, in general, to be third-
party applications. By definition, they should follow the described
standards of PA-DSS. We use these standards as a guideline for
best security practices on payment applications, and blockchain
platforms fall under the umbrella.
3 RELATED WORK
Blockchain, as with any other digital system, has vulnerabilities
and gaps leading to exploitations. Still in its infancy, the technology
is constantly evolving to create new and secure ways to operate.
Moreover, each blockchain comes with its own set of challenges
which depend on the mechanisms they use. For example, Ethereum
may face different security concerns than Bitcoin simply because
Ethereum chooses to use an account-based transaction model. Many
issues, whether severe flaws or privacy preferences have been doc¬
umented to highlight the evident or perceived shortcomings of
each blockchain. They can be separated into three major categories:
anonymity of users, privacy of transactions, and software assurance
ofcontracts. Each entails its own set ofchallenges and solutions, but
all are relevant to the comprehensive security of a given blockchain
system.
3.1 User security
User security has been a point ofdiscussion on more than blockchain
systems for years, and the contention continues onto this technol¬
ogy. Countless debates (and blockchains) are dedicated to proposing
the optimal solution to provide users with ample anonymity for
transactions on a blockchain. It is important to differentiate user
privacy from the other categories, as doing so will help to outline
the type of works included in this held. The goal ofblockchain, and
especially the Unspent Output from Bitcoin Transactions (abbrevi¬
ated as UTXO) transaction model, is to provide a mechanism for
secure transactions between two untrusting parties. As such, user
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information is one of the most important types of data that can be
disclosed. This has been a focal point for many in the blockchain
community, and user privacy is a part of the reason so many dif¬
ferent blockchains exist. Slight adaptations to a blockchain some¬
times necessitate a new system altogether. Overall, the idea of user
anonymity is not new, but with blockchain, it primarily concerns
the user’s preference rather than a severe security flaw (with ex¬
ceptions).
Ferrante and Mercer [17] outline the privacy improvements that
can be made to the existing Bitcoin platform. The focus of the paper
centralizes around the UTXO model and its transaction sources and
destinations. Since the basis ofUTXO is untrusting, user anonymity
is paramount. The researchers detail improvements to the model
to prevent the source or destination from knowing who has sent
or received the transaction. By doing so, there is no room for de¬
anonymization. Furthermore, this work overlaps heavily with trans¬
action privacy, wherein multiple solutions are proposed to further
increase privacy (these proposals will be discussed in the next sec¬
tion). Conti et al. [7] document blockchain vulnerabilities on its
transaction system; however, this work does not mention secu¬
rity and privacy aspects of Bitcoin wallets and user identity. Both
works [11] and [5] are the direct sources from which the researchers
retrieved their information. Koshy et al. [11] utilized network traffic
analysis to heuristically determine the IP addresses that linked with
the Bitcoin accounts. This is a severe vulnerability that compro¬
mises the anonymity supposed on Bitcoin’s platform.
User privacy is essential in a decentralized platform. With the
blockchain’s intrinsic availability to users, anonymity it is necessary
and cannot be overlooked as a luxury. Account privacy works hand-
in-hand with transactional security, for each transaction generally
links to a particular user or set of users. As smart contracts are
more widely considered for adoption, the security and privacy of
users and transactions cannot be of question. It must be at least as
reliable as modern centralized platforms. Even though these works
support progress in smart contract platforms, there is still more
work to be done.
3.2 Transaction security
Transaction security is undeniably important when considering
overall security of an application or platform. Data in transit must
be protected against both passive, active eavesdropping, and unin¬
tended alteration. When dealing with smart contracts, users still
face similar issues of traditional transaction systems. However,
blockchain technology has allowed certain growth from the per¬
spective of absolute privacy during transactions. Such advance¬
ments are detailed, and their benefits and drawbacks are outlined.
Ferrante and Mercer describe in their research the benefits of
using the UTXO transaction model to optimize transaction privacy,
especially between distrusting parties [? ]. The intrinsic security
features of the UTXO model, which include supposedly unidentifi¬
able accounts linked to unique transactions, by default outstrip the
privacy capabilities of the standard account-based model. However,
there have been studies that exploit certain aspects of the model
to track users. Due to possible vulnerabilities of the UTXO base
model, Koshy et al. [11] offer solutions to boost user privacy and
CSU Honor’s College Thesis, April 2019,
anonymity. The two recommended controls are linkable ring signa¬
tures and stealth addresses. Linkable ring signatures allow users
to verify that they are a part of a group without revealing exactly
which user they are. This group may be a set ofpublic keys, where a
user may have to use his or her private key to authenticate. Stealth
addresses ensure that a given user’s identity (address) is indistin¬
guishable from random, and they also guarantee that only a user
can conduct transactions through that account. These modifications
to the UTXO model raise the level ofprivacy for transactions on the
blockchain, eliminating the possibility of transaction identification
or spoofing. The work done by Sompolinsky and Zohar regard¬
ing a GHOST protocol for Bitcoin’s transactions centers around
mitigating double-spending attacks on the blockchain [23]. In stan¬
dard environments, malicious users may have the opportunity to
access and spend the same currency two or more times before the
blockchain realizes the error; this defines a double-spending attack.
With the GHOST protocol, the researchers theorize a system where
lightweight processing allows the high-rate transactions to execute
without this vulnerability. This protocol not only enhances the se¬
curity features while also presenting interesting follow-up inquiries
regarding the scalability of a blockchain platform. In essence, to
process transactions on a large scale, the GHOST protocol or an
equivalent is necessary to maintain security when scaling.
In the work done by the researchers Shunli et al, proposals for
account-based transaction models are used to boost privacy [13].
By implementing homomorphic encryption, a method where en¬
crypted data can be used to perform operations without decrypting
the data, information can be altered by authorized users. This elimi¬
nates the need to decrypt information to utilize it, which is standard
practice in most payment systems. Another feature mentioned was
a zero-knowledge (ZK) approach, which relies on hiding infor¬
mation from users unless absolutely necessary to the transaction.
These solutions are proposed on the account-based model, which
may boost the intrinsic privacy to match that of the UTXO model.
The work done by Andrychowicz et al. [2] pertains to honest
participants and transactional assurance. While not directly tied to
privacy, assurance is still an integral component of security, and
these researchers designed a trustless protocol to prevent fraud
and exploitation. On a similar note, Zhang et al. [26] proposes an
authenticated data feed for smart contracts. This work doesn’t refer
to smart contract security itself, but rather the data that would
inevitably feed into a smart contract platform. The authenticity of
this data is just as vital as the data generated on the blockchain
itself, and it should be considered relevant to the overall maturity
of smart contract security. Gray and Hadju have also contributed to
the smart contract security realm with a practical implementation
utilizing Cryptlets [14-16]. In their work, they contextualize the
need for an optimized, trustless mode for transactions and analyze
the Ethereum platform, wherein they describe the optimization
woes that it has faced in the past. They offer a platform optimization
using Cryptlets, a seemingly third-party-reminiscent repository
which stores the logic of a smart contract to be executed by a
node on the blockchain. Based on a semi-trust or fully-trust model,
Cryptlets offer an optimized platform that does not rely on each
node to execute the logic of a smart contract, providing a reduced
computational overhead for the blockchain as a whole. This is
known outside of blockchain technology as cyber-offloading.
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Cyber-offloading, particularly on a blockchain, is dangerous
to the integrity of decentralized systems, as it relies on a trusted
third-party to maintain integrity parallel to the blockchain. How¬
ever, in a more pragmatic sense, offloading is a reasonable risk
for business implementations of smart contract technology. There
is incentive for organizations to use a trust or semi-trust model,
considering there is some liability and governance surrounding the
execution of smart contracts. This may be seen as a transitional
middle-ground between centralized and decentralized platforms.
In 2016, Hawk was created as a smart contract platform, which
boosted security measures for code design on that platform [10].
This adaptive platform automates cryptographic protocols, such
as encryption, for smart contracts. Essentially, developers do not
need to manually code the cryptography on the contracts as this
process is handled by the compiler. This protocol remediates the
traditional lack of privacy on most popular decentralized platforms,
and it does so without burdensome interference for the users and
developers. Since this platform was designed with transactional
privacy in mind, it may be difficult to port this technology or pro¬
tocol to other platforms without a complete redesign. Regardless,
the success of this automated cryptographic protocol shows that
security can be implemented intuitively and automatically, given
the right design.
Transactional security is a focal point for many different works
on smart contracts, and the progression towards optimal privacy is
undeniable. Many of the researchers referenced, as well as many
other smart contract developers, have designed unique, separate
platforms for each protocol change. The challenge, at this time, is
not solving the issue of transactional privacy on a decentralized
network, but rather implementing the solutions already discovered,
governing the maintenance of said solutions, and ensuring there
are as few vulnerabilities as possible.
3.3 Software assurance of contracts
Many researchers have also chosen to target the smart contract
code itself, finding various shortcomings with regards to software
assurance. These issues are outside the scope of this paper, but
the impact of software assurance is evident, and it is necessary
to acknowledge its progress. Bartoletti and Pompianu, in their re¬
search, analyze the popular smart contract platforms, Ethereum
and Bitcoin, for their security implementation [4], Their focus is
on the available code for smart contracts on each platform, analyz¬
ing it for patterns in design. The purpose of this paper is to find a
recurring issue in the design of smart contracts such that it may be
remediated. The empirical process the researchers follow is highly
adoptable and may follow the structure oforganizations that review
smart contract code.
Delmolino et al have also seen the value in software assurance for
smart contracts, like any other piece ofcode [8]. By analyzing public-
domain smart contracts, they noticed patterns and recurring issues
in the programming practices. As a result, the researchers created
open-source platforms to teach programming for smart contracts.
This paper largely focuses on the education of safe programming
practices, but the core components of smart contracts and their
code are programmers. Therefore, the training of such practices is
necessary for proper progression in smart contract security.
Bello
Similar to the work of Delmolino et al, Luu et al documented
their findings of smart contract bugs on the Ethereum platform [12].
Their work is limited to a single platform, albeit the largest smart
contract blockchain used at the moment. By describing the pitfalls
of smart contracts on Ethereum, they both contextualize the impact
of these bugs and find common threads between them. Smart con¬
tract bugs often result in lost or stolen cryptocurrencies, sometimes
totaling the equivalent of millions of dollars, and this paper de¬
scribes how each attack or bug executed. Furthermore, the common
characteristics of the bugs allow a conclusion to be made around
the specific programming practices that lead to each vulnerability.
Buterin’s describes Ethereum bugs that have the same principal
practices that lead to bugs on the smart contract platform [25], Bugs
like Transaction Ordering Dependence, timestamp dependence, mis¬
handled exceptions, and many others, are pervasive throughout
smart contract code. Still in its infancy, smart contract software
assurance’s state can be seen through the lens of the bugs docu¬
mented so far. Blockchain and smart contract bugs have stumbled
into infamy with their costly mistakes, and each vulnerability seems
to uncover more. In a blog post written on Ethereum’s website, a
list of the most popular bugs can be found with a description of
their causes and effects [3]. This work serves as another indication
that software assurance is at the forefront of most people’s minds
when discussing smart contract security.
From the research compiled on software assurance, it is clear
that, while there has been significant progress to remediate and
prevent bugs from existing, there is still much work to be done.
Specifically, the shortcomings of non-Ethereum bug documentation,
along with cross-platform bug documentation, limit the progress of
new smart contract platforms from prospering. Without formal code
review, it is difficult to determine the strength of smart contracts.
Many platforms have not had the attention that Ethereum has; as a
result, there may be undiscovered bugs present on their platforms.
Furthermore, software assurance has received the bulk of focus
from the community as a whole, leaving protocol-level security
with fewer resources. The community of blockchain and smart
contracts has developed a handful of useful protocols, practices,
and platforms that boost security. Nevertheless, there is a clear
ceiling on smart contracts that must be conquered before adoption
in enterprise business environments.
3.4 Limitations of current blockchain
platforms
With major popularity in the community, blockchains and smart
contracts have been subject to both praise and scrutiny. Even with
its revolutionary design to eliminate many of the issues central¬
ized systems face, there are still many shortcomings that must
be addressed before the technology is deemed mature by security
standards. Aside from the aforementioned security concerns and re¬
search, there are still some remaining limitations of smart contract
platforms.
Some of the most popular platforms, namely Bitcoin and Ethereum,
have succeeded both due to their first-to-market status and sim¬
plicity in execution. However, they both fall victim to an issue that
serves as a substantial roadblock to large-scale adoption: space
on disk. Ethereum, as of 2017, was documented at over 350GB,
       
           
         
           
         
             
            
  
           
         
           
           
            
          
           
         
          
          
            
   
           
          
          
           
        
        
        
           
        
          
           
        
          
          
       
        
            
          
  
           
         
        
           
            
           
          
             
      
  
           
           
         
         
         
         
         
      
          
         
            
            
             
         
           
         
    
         
          
          
          
       
         
           
          
        
           
  
          
           
          
           
             
          
          
         
       
          
          
           
         
         
          
        
           
          
           
          
             
          
         
         
          
      
          
          
           
          
         
          
         
          
        
Adapting Financial Technology Standards to Blockchain Platforms
with Bitcoin being a very comparable size. Simply put, this spatial
requirement is not sustainable for widespread adoption, which in¬
evitably involves mobile devices. There is a balance to be struck
between complete access to the blockchain and computational via¬
bility on mobile. So far, there are only a handful of platforms, none
of them as popular as Ethereum or Bitcoin, that attempt to solve
this issue.
Due to the communal nature of blockchain as a whole, smart
contracts suffer from the same detriment: lack of standardization.
With everyone’s hand in the proverbial cookie jar, there is little
room to prevent a myriad of unmanageable smart contracts and un¬
safe protocols. Only recently has there been more effort in the space
of academic and professional research to expand on the security
controls of smart contract platforms. More work is needed here to
advance the viability of smart contracts in enterprise environments.
Security and privacy concerns will always be forthcoming and new¬
found, but the baseline by which smart contracts are standardized
must be developed to ensure the proper measures are in place to
protect private information.
From the related work, it is clear that the community surround¬
ing blockchain and smart contract technology is very focused on
user and transaction privacy. Based on the research already con¬
ducted, we find a few proposed solutions to boost user security
based on disallowing deanonymization of user addresses, using
stealth addresses, and implementing linkable ring signatures. Fur¬
thermore, proposed solutions for transaction security show promise
as well. The GHOST protocol, along with the ZK approach with
homomorphic encryption, both show substantial results in boosting
the overall security of transactions on a blockchain. Integrity main¬
tenance on these platforms is paramount, so work done to boost
transaction assurance through authenticated data feeds is undoubt¬
edly valuable to a security-focused blockchain. We begin to notice
room for concern when researchers drift away from a zero-trust
approach for blockchain systems. With Cryptlet’s cyber-offloading
architecture, maintaining integrity for the centralized storage point
is the weak link in the structure. Moving toward a semi-trust or
full-trust model can only work with proper governance over the
central unit.
With all of the work done with respect to blockchain secu¬
rity, especially the research that uncovered identity linking with
supposedly-anonymous pseudonyms on Bitcoin [7], it is interesting
to note that no researcher has acknowledged the security and pri¬
vacy of the ledger itself. Bitcoin, and a number of other platforms,
have no record of protecting the transaction data logged on the
ledger from viewing. With the de-anonymization of user IDs and
addresses, it is a point of concern to keep in mind when discussing
the comprehensive security of blockchain platforms.
METHODOLOGY
To adapt a set of standards to match the nontraditional mechanisms
ofblockchain platforms, it is necessary to first establish the baseline
standards by which we compare blockchain and centralized plat¬
forms. The Payment Application Data Security Standard [22] [22]
defines the set of guidelines for traditional transaction applications.
We analyze each guideline and highlight the shortcomings with
respect to their applicability on decentralized systems. Based on
CSU Honor’s College Thesis, April 2019,
its ability to be directly applicable to decentralized platforms, we
categorize each guideline as either Fully Applicable, Partially Appli¬
cable, or Not Applicable. If a guideline is deemed Fully Applicable, it
is able to be applied without alteration to a decentralized system. If
a guideline is deemed Partially Applicable, it is able to be applied to
decentralized platforms with modifications. Ifa guideline is deemed
Not Applicable, it cannot be applied to a decentralized system with¬
out major alteration (in these cases, alteration would essentially
create a new standard).
Rationalizations for the categorization of guidelines are given in
the full PA-DSS analysis table. Each guideline was categorized for
a specific reason, and the rationalization field dictates why each
decision was made. This field may also contain supplemental con¬
siderations for Fully Applicable guidelines, wherein suggestions
are proposed to incorporate decentralized platforms into the scope
of the standard. That is, the Fully Applicable guidelines may be
fully applicable to traditional payment systems, and they may also
be applicable to decentralized payment systems, but supplemen¬
tal information is necessary (and proposed) to cover the scope of
decentralized systems.
Ohce the analysis of the PA-DSS guidelines are complete, we
adapt the guidelines to create a fully-enveloping set of standards for
centralized and decentralized platforms. It is important to note that
this set of standards includes guidelines for both types of platforms,
not one or the other. By doing this, we create a comprehensive set
of standards that applies to modern payment applications and their
underlying technology. The new set of standards is described in
a table with several categories: Current Standard, Applicability to
blockchain Platforms, Rationalization, and New Standard. These
categories serve to identify weaknesses in the current PA-DSS stan¬
dards as they apply to blockchain. Furthermore, we revise standards,
if necessary, to form a comprehensive standard for both types of
platforms. After developing the revised PA-DSS standards, we an¬
alyze two blockchain and smart contract platforms: QTUM and
Ethereum. Both platforms are scrutinized for their adherence to the
newly defined standards. The platforms overall security maturity
is also taken into consideration, and there is an opportunity for
the security measures of the blockchain platforms to warrant the
revision of the new standards. The manual analysis of the QTUM
and Ethereum platforms includes a high-level review of the plat¬
form as it appears to a standard user, a code-level review of user
profiles and transaction execution, and a reporting of key security
findings. The review of each platform determines whether recent
security features in the blockchain community have been adopted:
the review also compares the blockchain platforms with the security
mechanisms of modern traditional payment applications.
There are many standards developed by the Payment Card Indus¬
try to govern the way transaction information is stored, transmitted,
and used, but the PA-DSS standard applies directly to the context
of new payment systems, such as blockchain. By analyzing this
standard, we reimagine transaction data protection in a context
where current standards do not match current technology. By cre¬
ating a structured approach to analyzing the blockchain platforms
against the revised PA-DSS standards, we ensure that each platform
is adequately analyzed for its implemented security mechanisms.
4
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Ultimately, we achieve a sound result in adapting traditional pay¬
ment standards to a nontraditional technology that is gaining more
popularity by the day.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Applying PA-DSS to blockchain platforms
Financial institutions use Payment Card Industry (PCI) standards to
ensure the secure development of their technology environments.
Most industries that incorporate technology into the business model
have equivalent standards, but the payment card industry heavily
relies on standards to determine the security of their technology.
The Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS) focuses
on financial technology applications; that is, the software that pro¬
cesses, stores, or otherwise encounters sensitive payment data will
follow the standards set by the PA-DSS [22], The full table of the
critiqued and adapted PA-DSS standards are too long to include in
this work, but have been made available for reference [9],
The Payment Application Data Security Standard, more com¬
monly referred to as the (PA-DSS), was first published in 2008 as
the Payment Application Best Practices (PABS) [21]. It is currently
governed by five major global payment brands: American Express,
Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard World¬
wide, and Visa Inc. These organizations collaborate to determine
the security requirements for third-party payment applications. It
should be noted that this standard specifically targets third-party
payment applications, for their systems are likely to be distributed
to multiple vendors. As such, their system will not be tailored
for a single organization; tailored solutions or applications built
for a single company are not mandated by this standard. The PA-
DSS standards have existed from 2008, but they have been revised
through several iterations since then. Version 1 was published when
the PABS was formed. Two years later, version 2.0 was released, and
in 2013, version 3.0 was published. The current version, v3.2, holds
minor changes outside the actual standards list. For this reason, we
chose version 3.0 for this study [21],
Because of the scope of this research, it is clear that payment
applications are within scope of this standard, regardless of spec¬
ified technology. Blockchain platforms, in most use cases, can be
considered payment systems because they are used to send and
receive currency. Because they are also not typically developed
by organizations that may use them, they can also be assumed, in
general, to be third-party applications. By definition, they should
follow the described standards of PA-DSS. We use these standards
as a guideline for best security practices on payment applications,
and blockchain platforms fall under the umbrella. The PA-DSS is
designed for modern, centralized applications, and decentralized
platforms have contrasting designs that make the standard only
partially useable. Data access, data confidentiality, and the very
definition of what sensitive information is all contributing factors
to the necessity for revisions to the PA-DSS to include blockchain
technology. Both centralized and decentralized systems support
transactions, so widespread adoption also requires proper security
standards to prevent exploitation.
Upon analysis of the PA-DSS standards, we find that, of the forty
(40) standards reviewed, several ofthe standards do not allow proper
adaptation to blockchain platforms. The breakdown of applicability
Bello
Table 1: Summary of the applicability of PA-DSS standards
in blockchain platforms
Fully applicable Partially applicable Not applicable
33 7 3
can be seen in Table 1. While the majority of the standards are still
applicable to blockchain platforms, there are significant gaps in the
scope of the PA-DSS standards.
A key area for revision is the classification of sensitive data and
how to properly manage the data. Five of the standards marked
Partially Applicable deal with the mandatory secure storage and
transmission of sensitive information. With traditional payment
systems, cardholder data is clearly defined, and the PA-DSS stan¬
dards match the definitions. The current standards explicitly list
fields that must be securely handled, such as credit-card number
(CCN), primary account number (PAN), and PIN numbers. However,
due to the anatomy of blockchain transactions, with user IDs as
the main form of identification and direction for the transaction,
user IDs have a much larger role than most cardholder data fields.
User IDs are essentially used as source and destination placeholders
for the transaction, and the same is true for the data stored on the
ledger. As such, the standards must be revised to account for this
difference in core architecture of the payment platform.
Data access and platform logging are two more categorical issues
with the current standards. On traditional platforms, data access
is, in most situations, restricted only to a select number of busi¬
ness employees; on traditional platforms, this is understandable
considering this data is vulnerable to manipulation and/or destruc¬
tion. Logging is typically implemented in the same scenario to
ensure that the organization knows who is accessing the data at
any time. However, there is a fundamental change in data access
on blockchain platforms: the data is available for all participants to
view. As a result, data access cannot be restricted, lest the integrity
of the blockchain be compromised. If data access was limited on
blockchain platforms, then the trust model that blockchain tech¬
nology is built on would be destroyed altogether. Access logging
is also difficult logistically (and arguably needless) on blockchain
platforms. If all participating nodes have access to the ledger, then
it is safe to assume every participant can or has viewed the data,
secured or not. The three standards associated with data access
and logging, consequently, are revised to match the information
dynamic present on blockchains.
Vulnerability identification and remediation, including the pro¬
cess of patching, are specified in the PA-DSS standards, but they
understandably lack the exceptions necessary for an immutable
blockchain. For traditional payment systems, vulnerability scan¬
ning and remediation is an arduous and ongoing challenge. Patches
to code and platforms are difficult on traditional payment systems,
but blockchain platforms impose an entirely unique and complex
roadblock to remediation. Blockchain platforms, inherently un¬
changeable, do not allow the same process of vulnerability remedi¬
ation. Smart contracts are stored on the blockchain, and the only
solution to remediate a vulnerable smart contract is to disallow it
from further use and create a new (remediated) code to store on
       
         
          
            
           
          
         
           
         
         
          
        
            
 
   
         
         
        
           
        
           
        
           
           
  
          
        
        
         
         
       
           
          
           
          
            
       
           
   
        
         
           
            
           
          
         
          
         
          
           
  
         
         
         
           
        
      
          
     
    
       
 
         
          
             
  
           
         
            
          
       
          
          
          
           
          
          
           
           
           
           
           
 
          
          
            
         
         
         
       
          
          
          
        
          
           
           
           
           
            
          
            
         
         
          
   
     
         
          
Adapting Financial Technology Standards to Blockchain Platforms
the blockchain. Moreover, blockchain platforms as a whole have
been known to have vulnerabilities; to remediate weaknesses to the
entire platform, the blockchain must be forked to create a new, but
related, platform to be used. The current PA-DSS standards do not
account for such processes, and revisions are necessary to accom¬
modate blockchain systems. Based on the above observations and
revisions to the PA-DSS standards, we compiled a list of controls
to look for when analyzing the case-study blockchain platforms.
Overall, the PA-DSS standards are excellent measures for protecting
traditional payment platforms, but they fall short in several aspects
concerning blockchain platforms. After revisions, the standards are
much more comprehensive and are ready to be applied to the case
studies.
5.2 Case studies
The two blockchain platforms, QTUM and Ethereum, are popular
and well-developed systems that have been considered for business
adoption. These platforms signify advancements from the early
stages of blockchain platforms, such as Bitcoin, for they offer sup¬
posed enhancements to the weaknesses of Bitcoin-like platforms.
Based on the analysis of each platform, we find fundamental short¬
comings for both platforms when considering business adoption
in the US financial industry. Based on the adapted PA-DSS stan¬
dards, we identify key points of security weakness that lead to
sub-standard platforms.
The Ethereum platform is one of the most popular blockchains
with a key advancement from early cryptocurrency platforms:
smart contract support. With this advancement, Ethereum estab¬
lishes its potential for financial technology adoption. Upon analysis,
we find that Ethereum has a fundamental design, non-protected
transaction information, that undermines the PA-DSS standards.
User IDs are publicly available on the blockchain ledger, along with
currency transaction data. From this information, it is trivial to
link all transactions to a single pseudonym, and Ethereum has a
dedicated webpage that allows anyone to see all transactions made
by a given user. Furthermore, Ethereum does not adopt most of the
privacy-boosting mechanisms that more recent blockchains have
developed. As a result, there is little obfuscation between two users
conducting a transaction.
The implications of Ethereum’s security measures matters most
when considering real-world business adoption. A common use case
for smart contracts in enterprise is as follows: two businesses auto¬
mate a contractual subscription to goods or services. In this use case,
businesses must know who they are sending money to, and vice
versa. Without proper data security, namely on the transactional in¬
formation, it is possible to make inferences towards inter-business
transactions from the ledger alone. The reality is that complete
anonymity is not feasible for business adoption; therefore, proper
data security is necessary to obfuscate the representation of the
transaction on the ledger. This can be achieved via the revised
PA-DSS standards.
The PA-DSS standards, when used to analyze Ethereum’s plat¬
form, show a significant oversight regarding data security. While
the oversight may be understandable considering business or en¬
terprise adoption was not foreseen by Ethereum, it does result in
the platform’s weakness towards large-scale financial adoption. To
CSU Honor’s College Thesis, April 2019,
Table 2: Summary of violations of the adapted PA-DSS stan¬
dards in QTUM and Ethereum
Technology Total violations Violations
Ethereum 5 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 11.2, 12.2
QTUM 5 2.1,2.2,2.3,11.2,12.2
remediate, Ethereum would have to fundamentally alter the way
data is stored on the blockchain, encrypting sensitive data before
the ledger stores it. As it stands, Ethereum does not meet the revised
PA-DSS standards.
QTUM is designed specifically to be a platform ready for light¬
weight, versatile business deployment, according to its white papers.
Its main features, in addition to the blockchain itself, include a lite
wallet for mobile use and a transaction-model abstraction layer to
allow transactions between UTXO and account-based platforms
(e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum). The business viability seems to be
strong, but the PA-DSS standards show that the platform faces
similar issues to Ethereum. Static user IDs and transaction data
are stored on the ledger without encryption. QTUM, too, has a
webpage that allows users to search for specific transactions and
list all of a specific user’s transactions. However, with QTUM’s
added functionality of lite wallets, there is more to analyze against
the standards. After review, the lite wallet features a robust secu¬
rity system to protect the account and transaction data when it
is on mobile devices. Furthermore, we find no weaknesses in the
data transmission between lite wallets and the core wallet of the
blockchain.
The implications of QTUM are almost identical to the repercus¬
sions ofEthereum’s platform given a real-world scenario. User data
stored on the ledger is not private, and inferences can be made
based on repeated transactions on the system. Moreover, peer-to-
peer communications do not obfuscate the source or destination
addresses, meaning anonymity is only partially achieved. No mod¬
ern security measures of community-developed blockchains have
been adopted to ensure proper privacy between users or transac¬
tions. However, the lite wallets show some attention to security,
with standard security measures in place to protect local account
information when stored. The PA-DSS standards uncover signifi¬
cant issues concerning both QTUM and Ethereum. From the table,
we see the exact standards that each platform violated from the
adapted PA-DSS standards, along with a total count for the viola¬
tions. Each platform had 5 violations, all directly related to data
security and handling. Table 2 shows a summary of the violations
for each platform. Data security is a vital portion ofoverall payment
application security, and both platforms fall short in this regard.
More work is needed to ensure that businesses are able to adopt
blockchain platforms as payment systems. In their current state,
actual usability and transactional functionality is not the challenge;
instead, the platforms face the challenge of adhering to financial
technology’s security standards.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Blockchain technology and smart contracts are peaking in popu¬
larity, and many businesses are considering the adoption of such
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technology. Smart contracts allow the automation ofmany tasks
on a blockchain, including the automation of payments themselves.
Smart contracts, consequently, have garnered attention from busi¬
nesses for reducing the overhead of traditional contracts. However,
this new technology has many shortcomings, some of which are
not easily remediated.
The communal nature of blockchain development leads to a
lack of accountability in the products. There is no governance
or standardization of the platform development. With businesses
seeking out blockchain platforms, there is a need for a structured
methodology to fully analyze the capabilities and security of these
new, decentralized payment systems. Considering the financial
technology industry as a gold-standard for rigorous auditing, we
adopt the Payment Application Data Security Standards (PA-DSS) to
apply to blockchain platforms. By revising the standards to meet the
requirements of both parties, blockchain and financial technology
organizations, we solidify the methodology used to critique modern
smart contract platforms.
Through two case studies, QTUM and Ethereum, we report key
weaknesses in the foundations of the blockchain platforms. Data
security is the main issue, for neither system offers adequate user
privacy concerning transaction information. Transaction data are
openly available through the ledger, and privacy as a whole is com¬
promised as a result. There are critical alterations, including proper
data protection, to be made to each platform for PA-DSS compliance.
Fundamentally, smart contract platforms offer tremendous busi¬
ness potential, but the lack of security governance is overwhelming.
With sensitive transaction information present on these immutable
platforms, data security is essential and should not be overlooked.
Even with the modern security-focusing blockchains, there has
been little effort to standardize the solutions and provide a template
for a comprehensive blockchain security solution. This work sets
the precedence for continuing security practices into decentralized
payment systems.
From the results of the case studies and the adapted PA-DSS
standards, there is a clear set of next steps for contributors of the
Ethereum and QTUM platforms. Security changes can be made to
the existing platforms, or a new platform can be developed to both
implement a smart contract transaction platform and securely store
data. Developing such a system would be time-consuming, but it
would provide the necessary security measures to ensure proper
data handling at the transaction level. Moreover, analyzing more
smart contract platforms would prove useful in creating a survey of
common security practice (or malpractice) in the blockchain com¬
munity. The Payment Card Industry is a well-known, established
field where security standards are heavily enforced, but there are
many other technology industries that would benefit from the same
type of standards adaptation. The Healthcare industry, for example,
has several data privacy laws to follow with respect to health in¬
formation. There have been discussions and research surrounding
the adoption of blockchain models to healthcare, but the extent
at which the security measures have been thought out is unclear.
There is, at the least, room for consolidation of information.
Data privacy and security is the main focus of this work, but there
are other aspects that lie outside the scope of this work. Blockchain
solves one of data protection’s most notable issues: data integrity.
That is, data on the blockchain is immutable. There have been many
Bello
experiments and new blockchains that propose new methods to
enhance the blockchains speed or usability. However, a comprehen¬
sive analysis of such innovations may prove helpful in determining
the best approach for designing payment systems for particular
purposes or audiences.
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7 APPENDIX
Standard
Number
1. 
D
O
 N
O
T 
R
ET
A
IN
 F
U
LL
 T
R
A
C
K
 D
A
TA
, C
A
RD
 V
ER
IF
IC
A
TI
O
N
 C
O
D
E 
O
R
 V
A
LU
E 
(C
AV
2, 
C
ID
, C
V
C
2,
 C
V
V
2),
 O
R
 P
IN
 B
LO
C
K
 D
A
TA
 
1,1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
Current Standard
After authorization, do not
store the full contents of any
track from the magnetic stripe
(that is on the back ofa card,
in a chip or elsewhere).
After authorization, do not
store the card-validation value
or code (three-digit or four¬
digit number printed on the
front or back ofa payment
card) used to verify card-not-
present transactions.
After authorization, do not
store the personal
identification number (PIN) or
the encrypted PIN block.
Securely delete any magnetic
stripe data, card validation
values or codes, and PINs or
PIN block data stored by
previous versions of the
payment application, in
accordance with industry-
accepted standards for secure
deletion, as defined, for
example by the list of
approved products maintained
by the National Security
Agency, or by other State or
Applicability
to Blockchain
Platforms
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
Rationalization
Depending on the
transaction method used
on the decentralized
application, card data may
still need protection.
Magnetic stripes, CV
codes, or other sensitive
card data will be
protected ifpresent. Ifno
card data is used (e.g.
non-card-based
transaction system such
as UTXO), this standard
is no longer applicable.
Depending on the
transaction method used
on the decentralized
application, card data may
still need protection.
Magnetic stripes, CV
codes, or other sensitive
card data will be
protected ifpresent. Ifno
card data is used (e.g.
non-card-based
transaction system such
as UTXO), this standard
is no longer applicable.
Depending on the
transaction method used
on the decentralized
application, card data may
still need protection.
Magnetic stripes, CV
codes, or other sensitive
card data will be
protected ifpresent. Ifno
card data is used (e.g.
non-card-based
transaction system such
as UTXO), this standard
is no longer applicable.
Depending on the
transaction method used
on the decentralized
application, card data may
still need to be securely
deleted.
New Standard
After authorization, do not
store the full contents ofany
track from the magnetic stripe
(that is on the back of a card,
in a chip or elsewhere).
After authorization, do not
store the card-validation value
or code (three-digit or four¬
digit number printed on the
front or back ofa payment
card) used to verify card-not-
present transactions.
After authorization, do not
store the personal
identification number (PIN) or
the encrypted PIN block.
Securely delete any magnetic
stripe data, card validation
values or codes, and PINs or
PIN block data stored by
previous versions ofthe
payment application, in
accordance with industry-
accepted standards for secure
deletion, as defined, for
example by the list of
approved products maintained
by the National Security
Agency, or by other State or
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National standards or
regulations.
Securely delete any sensitive
authentication data (pre¬
authorization data) used for
debugging or troubleshooting
purposes from log files,
debugging files, and other data
1.1.5 sources received from
customers, to ensure that
magnetic stripe data, card
validation codes or values, and
PINS or PIN block data are
not stored on software vendor
systems.
Software vendor must provide
guidance to customers
regarding purging of
cardholder data after
expiration of customer-defined
retention period.
2.1
Mask PAN when displayed
(the first six and last four
digits are the maximum
number ofdigits to be
displayed).
2.2
Render PAN, at a minimum,
unreadable anywhere it is
stored.
2.3
Ifdisk encryption is used
(rather than file- or column-
FULLY
APPLICABLE
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
Depending on the
transaction method used
on the decentralized
application,
authentication data may
still need to be securely
deleted.
Decentralized
applications [smart
contracts] differ from the
decentralized platform
[e.g. Ethereum] itself.
Data retention standards
apply normally to
applications that may
store cardholder data.
They do not apply to the
data stored on the
blockchain itself, as the
data should exist
immutably.
We know the data stored
on the blockchain for
cryptocurrency accounts;
we can only assume the
type ofdata stored on the
blockchain with
traditional transactions.
That data, however,
should be stored securely.
This standard is specific
to cardholder data. When
cardholder data is used,
this standard should be
followed.
CCN is similar to account
ID on decentralized
platfonns. There is an
equivalence to be drawn
between the two types of
data, and both should be
equally secured.
The equivalent to PAN in
a decentralized platform
must be properly stored.
PAN and user ID can be
viewed equivalently, and
they should be secured
equally.
This standard is based in
a central management
National standards or
regulations.
Securely delete any sensitive
authentication data (pre¬
authorization data) used for
debugging or troubleshooting
purposes from log files,
debugging files, and other data
sources received from
customers, to ensure that
magnetic stripe data, card
validation codes or values, and
PINS or PIN block data are
not stored on software vendor
systems.
Software vendor must provide
guidance to customers
regarding purging of
cardholder data after
expiration ofcustomer-defined
retention period.
Retention period ofcustomer
data is dependent on
transactional method.
Blockchain ledgers will
securely store transactional
data permanently regardless of
transaction method.
Mask PAN when displayed
(the first six and last four
digits are the maximum
number of digits to be
displayed).
On blockchain platfonns,
UTXO and Account-Based
transaction models require
user ID for transactions. User
ID or any infonnation
determining a transaction’s
source or destination should be
masked when displayed.
Render PAN, at a minimum,
unreadable anywhere it is
stored.
Ifon a blockchain platform
with blockchain-specific
transaction models, render
user ID unreadable by
unauthorized users when
stored__
Ifdisk encryption is used
(rather than file- or column-
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A
Y
M
EN
T 
3.
 P
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level database encryption),
logical access must be
managed independently of
native operating system access
control mechanisms.
Payment application must
protect encryption keys used
2.5 for encryption of cardholder
data against disclosure and
misuse.
Payment application must
implement key management
2.6 processes and procedures for
keys used for encryption of
cardholder data.
Securely delete any
cryptographic key material or
cryptogram stored by previous
2.7 versions ofthe payment
application, in accordance
with industry-accepted
standards for secure deletion.
The “out ofthe box”
installation ofthe payment
application in place at the
completion ofthe installation
process, must facilitate use of
unique usernames and secure
authentication for all
administrative access and for
all access to cardholder data.3.1
Access to PCs, servers, and
databases with payment
3.2 applications must require a
unique username and secure
authentication.
Encrypt payment application
passwords during transmission
3.3 and storage, using strong
cryptography based on
approved standards.
At the completion ofthe
installation process, the “out
ofthe box” default installation
ofthe payment application
must log all user access.
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
NOT
APPLICABLE
principle. There is no
change for a central
management application.
However, the
decentralized platform
may not follow the exact
same principles ofwhat
data to encrypt.
Wallet information may
also warrant encryption
during transactions.
Any information deemed
necessary to encrypt must
have equivalent, secure
key management
protocols.
Any information deemed
necessary to encrypt must
have equivalent, secure
key management
protocols.
Smart contracts placed on
the blockchain are
immutable unless proper
access is obtained to
allow destruction of the
contract. This access
should be restricted to
authorized users. Any
repository storing
cardholder data (or
equivalent sensitive
information) should
follow the standards
already established unless
on the blockchain itself.
Access to protected data
on the blockchain should
also be managed.
The core principles of
secure login and
authentication do not
change for decentralized
applications or platforms.
The core principles of
secure login and
authentication do not
change for decentralized
applications or platforms.
The nature ofthe
blockchain ledger makes
it unfeasible to
logistically log individual
events of access to the
ledger.
level database encryption),
logical access must be
managed independently of
native operating system access
control mechanisms.
Payment application must
protect encryption keys used
for encryption of cardholder
data against disclosure and
misuse.
Payment application must
implement key management
processes and procedures for
keys used for encryption of
cardholder data.
Securely delete any
cryptographic key material or
cryptogram stored by previous
versions of the payment
application, in accordance
with industry-accepted
standards for secure deletion.
The “out ofthe box”
installation ofthe payment
application in place at the
completion ofthe installation
process, must facilitate use of
unique usernames and secure
authentication for all
privileged and administrative
access and for all access to
cardholder data.
Access to PCs, servers, and
databases with payment
applications must require a
unique username and secure
authentication.
Encrypt payment application
passwords during transmission
and storage, using strong
cryptography based on
approved standards.
At the completion ofthe
installation process, the “out
ofthe box” default installation
ofthe payment application
must log all user access.
On a blockchain platform, user
access to the ledger will not be
logged, as it is available to all
blockchain nodes.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
     
 
 
 
    
   
   
    
   
    
   
    
     
 
     
       
    
      
   
 
   
    
    
  
   
   
 
 
   
  
   
 
   
    
   
 
   
    
    
  
   
   
 
    
   
    
   
    
  
 
 
   
  
   
 
   
    
   
 
    
   
    
   
    
  
 
    
    
   
  
 
 
   
  
   
 
   
    
   
 
    
    
   
  
 
    
      
   
   
 
 
   
  
   
 
   
    
   
 
    
      
   
   
 
   
    
    
  
 
 
  
    
  
 
  
    
   
    
    
  
 
   
   
   
    
    
    
   
   
 
 
  
    
  
 
  
    
   
   
   
    
    
    
   
   
 
   
     
  
 
 
  
    
  
 
  
    
   
     
  
6. 
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Payment application must
implement an automated audit
trail to track and monitor
access.
4.2
Develop all payment
applications based on industry
best practices and incorporate
information security5.1 throughout the software
development life cycle.
Develop all web payment
applications (internal and
external, and including web
administrative access to5.2 product) based on secure
coding guidelines.
Software vendor must follow
change control procedures for
all product software
configuration changes.5.3
The payment application must
not use or require use of
unnecessary and insecure
services and protocols.5.4
For payment applications
using wireless technology, the
wireless technology must be6.1 implemented securely.
For payment applications
using wireless technology,
payment application must
facilitate use of encrypted6.2 transmissions by using WiFi
protected access (WPA or
WPA2) technology, IPSEC
VPN or SSL/TLS.
Provide instructions for
customers about secure use of
wireless technology.6.3
NOT
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
The nature ofthe
blockchain ledger makes
it unfeasible to
logistically log or audit
individual events of
access to the ledger.
Secure coding and
communication practices
are comparable for
decentralized
applications. All practices
should be followed to
protect against security
threats.
Secure coding and
communication practices
are comparable for
decentralized
applications. All practices
should be followed to
protect against security
threats.
Secure coding and
communication practices
are comparable for
decentralized
applications. All practices
should be followed to
protect against security
threats.
Secure coding and
communication practices
are comparable for
decentralized
applications. All practices
should be followed to
protect against security
threats.
Wireless transmission
security standards are not
dependent on
decentralized
applications. The
standards are the same.
Wireless transmission
security standards are not
dependent on
decentralized
applications. The
standards are the same.
Wireless transmission
security standards are not
dependent on
decentralized
applications. The
standards are the same.
Payment application must
implement an automated audit
trail to track and monitor
access.
On a blockchain platform, user
access to the ledger will not be
monitored or logged for
auditing, as it is available to
all blockchain nodes.
Develop all payment
applications based on industry
best practices and incorporate
information security
throughout the software
development life cycle.
Develop all web payment
applications (internal and
external, and including web
administrative access to
product) based on secure
coding guidelines.
Software vendor must follow
change control procedures for
all product software
configuration changes.
The payment application must
not use or require use of
unnecessary and insecure
services and protocols.
For payment applications
using wireless technology, the
wireless technology must be
implemented securely.
For payment applications
using wireless technology,
payment application must
facilitate use of encrypted
transmissions by using WiFi
protected access (WPA or
WPA2) technology, IPSEC
VPN or SSL/TLS.
Provide instructions for
customers about secure use of
wireless technology.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
     
   
   
    
     
    
  
 
   
     
   
    
   
    
     
    
    
     
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
   
    
    
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
   
    
    
   
    
      
    
     
    
   
    
 
    
      
    
  
    
    
    
    
    
 
    
      
     
     
    
   
    
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
  
  
   
     
   
   
    
     
    
  
 
   
     
   
    
   
    
     
    
    
     
    
 
   
      
     
    
    
     
    
    
      
    
    
    
   
    
 
    
      
    
  
   
   
    
    
    
 
    
      
     
     
   
   
    
  
8. 
FA
C
IL
IT
A
TE
 S
EC
U
R
E 
N
ET
W
R
O
K
 IM
PL
EM
EN
TA
TI
O
N
 
7.
 T
ES
T 
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Y
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T 
A
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C
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TO
 A
D
D
R
ES
S 
V
U
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A
B
IL
IT
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S 
A
N
D Software vendors must Vulnerability control Software vendors must
establish a process to identity security standards are establish a process to identify
newly discovered security similar to decentralized newly discovered security
vulnerabilities (e.g., subscribe applications (smart vulnerabilities (e.g., subscribe
to alert services freely contracts). However, the to alert services freely
t.
t
I
7.1
available on the Internet) and
to test their payment
applications for
FULLY
APPLICABLE
immutability ofsmart
contracts on the
blockchain necessitates
available on the Internet) and
to test their payment
applications for
£ vulnerabilities. immediate action to vulnerabilities.
c remediate the contract.
* This entails creating new
C
-
F
•«
contract and disabling the
old, unsecure contract.
Software vendors must Vulnerability control Software vendors must
b
c
£
establish a process for timely
development and deployment
security standards are
similar to decentralized
establish a process for timely
development and deployment
F5£
r
ofsecurity patches and
upgrades, which includes
delivery ofupdates and
applications (smart
contracts). However, the
immutability ofsmart
of security patches and
upgrades, which includes
delivery ofupdates and
* patches in a secure manner contracts on the patches in a secure manner
£ with a known chain-of-trust, blockchain necessitates with a known chain-of-trust,
2
F
S
*
7.2
and maintenance ofthe
integrity ofpatch and update
code during delivery and
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
immediate action to
remediate the contract.
This entails creating new
and maintenance ofthe
integrity ofpatch and update
code during delivery and
deployment. contract and disabling the deployment.
old, unsecure contract. On blockchain platforms,
proper steps must be taken to
ensure the security ofthe
system. The disabling of
vulnerable smart contracts or
the forking ofthe blockchain
itselfmay be necessary.
The payment application must Secure network The payment application must
be able to be implemented into environments will still be be able to be implemented into
a secure network environment. necessary on a secure network environment.
8.1 Application must not interfere
with use of devices, 
FULLY
APPLICABLE
decentralized platforms. Application must not interfere
with use of devices,
applications, or configurations applications, or configurations
required for PCI DSS required for PCI DSS
compliance compliance
The payment application must Secure network The payment application must
only use or require use of environments will still be only use or require use of
necessary and secure services, necessary on necessary and secure services,
protocols, daemons, decentralized platforms. protocols, daemons,
components, and dependent FULLY components, and dependent
software and hardware, APPLICABLE software and hardware,
including those provided by including those provided by
third parties, for any third parties, for any
fiinctionality ofthe payment functionality of the payment
application. application.
The payment application must Secure network The payment application must
not require use ofservices or environments will still be not require use ofservices or
protocols that preclude the use necessary on protocols that preclude the use
8.3 ofor interfere with normal 
operation oftwo-factor
FULLY
APPLICABLE
decentralized platforms. ofor interfere with normal
operation oftwo-factor
authentication technologies for authentication technologies for
secure remote access to secure remote access to
network resources. network resources.
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9.
 
CA
RD
 D
A
TA
 The payment application must
be developed such that the
database server and web
- g j server are not required to be
C ' on the same server, nor is the
£ database server required to be
in the DMZ with the web
server. _
Ifpayment application updates
are delivered via remote
access into customers’
systems, software vendors
must tell customers to turn on
modem only when needed for
downloads from vendor, and
to turn offimmediately after
j q j download completes.
Alternatively, ifdelivered via
VPN or other high-speed
connection, software vendors
must advise customers to
properly configure a firewall
or a personal firewall product
to secure “always-on”
connections.
Any remote access into the
payment application must be
10.2 performed securely.
The payment application must
not interfere with use ofa two-
factor authentication
mechanism. The payment
11.1 application must allow for
technologies such as RADIUS
or TACACS with tokens, or
VPN with individual
certificates.
Ifthe payment application
facilitates sending ofPANs by
end-user messaging
technologies, the payment
application must provide a
solution that renders the PAN
unreadable or implements
11.2 strong cryptography or specify
the use of strong cryptography
to encrypt the PANs.
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
NOT
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
Depending on
implementation, data
storage may differ for
cardholder data and
decentralized-account
data.
Decentralized platforms
and applications do not
“update” in the same
manner as centralized
systems. Platforms “fork
and applications (smart
contracts) are destroyed
to prevent further use
when “updated.”
Remote access should be
governed in the same
manner as the standards
dictate.
Two-factor authentication
is still applicable.
The scope of data
protection must be
expanded to include
blockchain-specific
transaction models.
The payment application must
be developed such that the
database server and web server
are not required to be on the
same server, nor is the
database server required to be
in the DMZ with the web
server.
Ifpayment application updates
are delivered via remote
access into customers’
systems, software vendors
must tell customers to turn on
modem only when needed for
downloads from vendor, and
to turn off immediately after
download completes.
Alternatively, ifdelivered via
VPN or other high-speed
connection, software vendors
must advise customers to
properly configure a firewall
or a personal firewall product
to secure “always-on”
connections.
Any remote access into the
payment application must be
performed securely.
The payment application must
not interfere with use ofa two-
factor authentication
mechanism. The payment
application must allow for
technologies such as RADIUS
or TACACS with tokens, or
VPN with individual
certificates.
Ifthe payment application
facilitates sending ofPANs by
end-user messaging
technologies, the payment
application must provide a
solution that renders the PAN
unreadable or implements
strong cryptography or specify
the use of strong cryptography
to encrypt the PANs.
On blockchain platforms and
transaction models, all
sensitive transactional data
will be protected through
cryptography.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
     
    
    
    
   
    
 
 
 
   
   
    
 
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
     
    
    
    
   
    
 
 
    
    
   
    
    
 
 
    
   
   
     
    
  
  
 
    
    
   
    
    
    
   
   
    
    
 
 
    
   
    
      
   
  
  
 
 
  
    
      
  
    
   
    
      
   
  
  
 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
 
 
   
   
    
   
    
   
   
   
 
 
 
   
   
    
   
    
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
 
14
. A
SS
IG
N
 P
A
-D
SS
 R
ES
PO
N
SI
B
IL
IT
IE
S 
13
. M
A
IN
TA
IN
 
12
. E
N
C
R
Y
PT
 A
LL
 N
O
N
-C
O
N
SO
LE
 A
D
M
IN
IS
TR
A
TI
V
E 
Ifthe payment application
sends, or facilitates sending,
cardholder data over public
networks, the payment
application must support use
ofstrong cryptography and
security protocols such as12.1
secure sockets layer (SSL) /
transport layer security (TLS)
and, internet protocol security
(IPSEC) to safeguard sensitive
i
cardholder data duringi
transmission over open, public
networks.
The payment application must
never send unencrypted PANs
by end-user messaging
technologies (for example, e-
mail, instant messaging, chat).
12.2
Instruct customers to encrypt
all non-console administrative
access using technologies such
13.1 as SSH, VPN, or SSL/TLS for
web-based management and
other non-console
administrative access.
Develop, maintain, and
disseminate a PA-DSS
14.1 Implementation Guide(s) for
customers, resellers, and
integrators.
Develop and implement
training and communication
programs to ensure payment
application resellers and14.2 integrators know how to
implement the payment
application and related
systems and networks.
Develop and implement
training and communication
14.3 programs for payment
application integrators and
resellers.
FULLY
APPLICABLE
PARTIALLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
FULLY
APPLICABLE
Encryption is fully
applicable on blockchain
platforms and should be
used.
Data Loss Prevention is
fully applicable on
blockchain platforms and
should be used. The scope
should be expanded to
include blockchain-
specific transaction
models.
Standard communication
vectors should be treated
in the same manner as the
standard dictates.
n/a
n/a
n/a
Ifthe payment application
sends, or facilitates sending,
cardholder data over public
networks, the payment
application must support use
ofstrong cryptography and
security protocols such as
secure sockets layer (SSL) /
transport layer security (TLS)
and, internet protocol security
(IPSEC) to safeguard sensitive
cardholder data during
transmission over open, public
networks.
The payment application must
never send unencrypted PANs
by end-user messaging
technologies (for example, e-
mail, instant messaging, chat).
On blockchain platforms and
transaction models, no
sensitive transactional data
should be unencrypted when
sent over end-user messaging
technology.
Instruct customers to encrypt
all non-console administrative
access using technologies such
as SSH, VPN, or SSL/TLS for
web-based management and
other non-console
administrative access.
Develop, maintain, and
disseminate a PA-DSS
Implementation Guide(s) for
customers, resellers, and
integrators.
Develop and implement
training and communication
programs to ensure payment
application resellers and
integrators know how to
implement the payment
application and related
systems and networks.
Develop and implement
training and communication
programs for payment
application integrators and
resellers.
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